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In this study an attempt has been made to assess the potential of land as a municipal 
financing tool in four Indian cities, to enable better public service delivery and 
attainment of the MDGs. The institutional arrangements for land use are fragmented in 
India’s cities between the urban development authorities, which are state agencies, and 
the cities. To determine whether or not transfer of revenues from land to cities from the 
para-statal entities is justified, stochastic frontier analysis is used to determine the 
efficiency of Indian cities and the Indian states. The efficiency of service provision is 
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1 Introduction   
The year 2007 was important for urbanization since the number of urban inhabitants 
surpassed rural dwellers as a percentage of the total world population. The world 
population is expected to become two-third urban by 2025. The urbanization pattern in 
India also has been undergoing significant change, consistent with the worldwide 
phenomenon. The share of urban population in the total population of the country grew 
from 11per cent in 1901 to 26 per cent in 1991, and 29 per cent in 2001. While India 
adopts a very conservative definition of what is ‘urban’, the ‘urban’ population in India 
is expected to increase to about 500 million by 2021. 
  
While the urbanization phenomenon is widely accepted as being an inevitable by-
product of development, there are many undesirable outcomes that have resulted. 
According to the Government of India’s Ministry of Urban Development, 20 per cent of 
the country’s urban households do not have access to safe drinking water, 58 per cent do 
not have safe sanitation, and more than 40 per cent of garbage generated is left 
uncollected for want of proper waste management. 
  
There is no consensus on what the cause is of the poor state of such public service 
delivery in India’s cities. Some studies point to institutional overlaps and governance as 
factors causing problems in the delivery of public services (Savage and Dasgupta 2006; 
Sridhar 2006). Another set of studies point to weak municipal finances as the core of the 
problem (see Reedy 1986; Sridhar and Mathur 2009). Based on our discussions, field 
visits and observations, there is evidence that cities that have access to liquid sources of 
revenue such as octroi are able to provide public services such as solid waste 
management much better than others. Given this evidence, it is plausible to believe that 
finances play an important role in public service delivery. 
 
One reason for exploring innovative sources of development finance is that city finances 
in India are in poor condition. Most of India’s cities have now abolished the highly 
buoyant source of revenue, the octroi, which is now generally accepted to be 
distortionary in its effects. Further, the property tax base is at best subjective and has not 
yet become a resilient source of revenue. The sphere of municipal taxation was, in India 
some time ago, enlarged to include land tax and tax on land values; however, with the 
exception of a few local bodies in Tamil Nadu, little progress has been reported 
regarding the levy/enhancement of land taxes by local bodies. A high tax rate on land 
encourages improvements on land, and provides a disincentive for large speculative 
landholdings. A high land  value tax would decrease the market value of land and 
provide a stimulus to develop land to its full potential. 
  
Having said this, it should be recognized that local governments frequently have more 
flexibility in managing their assets than they do in adjusting tax rates, or introducing 
new taxes which require higher-level governmental approval (as in China) or are 
prohibited entirely by the fiscal framework. 
 
One of the means by which local governments increase revenues in the absence of an 
effective taxation system is through public land leasing (Ding 2005). While it is 
important to understand that land is a non-renewable resource and can be exhausted, one   2
option that has been given much less attention in municipal finances is their land assets. 
In fact, many cities and municipal governments have access to substantial land assets 
such as public buildings, housing, and municipally owned enterprises. It is also easy to 
understand that since local governments make infrastructure investments on their land, 
such as water supply networks, roads, and schools, these are likely to be capitalized in 
the land value. Further, urbanization and economic growth drive up land prices. In fact, 
Sridhar (2004) summarizes the disparity in real estate prices between the central 
business district and the suburbs of some of India’s metropolitan areas. Hence, 
municipal governments have every right to capture the outcome of economic growth 
which manifests itself in increased land prices, and also their own investment through 
sale (see Peterson 2007). Land in urban areas is a scarce resource which needs to be 
optimally utilized if the objective of affordable housing is to be attained and in order to 
halve global poverty by 2015, as set out in the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). 
 
Hence in this study, an attempt has been made to assess the potential of land as a 
municipal financing tool and for financing expenditures in India’s cities. Second, I have 
examined the case for whether or not Indian cities are more efficient than the states in 
the provision of public services (taking the case of roads), so that one may decide 
whether or not a case for transferring revenues from public land leasing and sales to 
cities exists. 
2  Objectives and scope 
The objective of this study is to gather systematic evidence regarding the actual 
potential of municipal land as a revenue generating source. In India, a large amount of 
urban land is held by urban development authorities (UDAs), and it is possible to use 
the revenues from their sales as an infrastructure financing strategy.1 However, there is 
very little systematic research, thus far, that throws light on the important role played by 
land held by the UDAs in municipal financing in India’s context. Further, if one 
advocates transfer of revenues away from state agencies such as the UDAs in favour of 
cities, one needs to throw light on why it would be beneficial for cities to have the extra 
resources. This is why the issue of efficiency of cities and the states in the provision of 
public services is examined. 
  
I assume that, given the institutional arrangements, UDAs are more efficient than city 
governments in raising revenues from land leasing and sales.2 The revenue raising 
                                                 
1 In India, a number of state government agencies such as the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development 
Board (KIADB) acquire and dispose land. For instance, as of July 2008 (Times of India, July 24, 2008), 
the KIADB had acquired 869 acres of farmland for a proposed hardware park, in addition to the over 
50,000 acres of surplus land which was waiting to be disposed through a specially formed realty 
corporation. There were reports that over 1,00,000 acres of land was lying with the state government of 
Karnataka in 2007 of which some 28,000 acres were encroached upon by politicians, builders, 
government servants, and many landless poor (some of them being former owners who lost their land 
during acquisition). A committee (Venkatswamy Committee) was set up to investigate these 
encroachment cases, but little was known of its report or recommendations (Times of India, 24 July 
2008). 
2 For instance, Sridhar and Reddy (2009) found, based on anecdotal evidence, that UDAs were more 
likely to rope in the private sector, and engaged in public private partnerships more actively for 
infrastructure projects, than the city governments.   3
efficiency of the UDAs compared with that of the city governments is not questioned 
here. I only make an attempt to examine the efficiency with which public services are 
offered by the city government when compared with that of the state governments 
(which the UDAs, being para-statal entities, represent). This is to understand, along with 
other reasons, whether there is a case for transferring the revenues so raised by the 
UDAs, to the city governments. 
 
In this study, I intend to answer the following questions: 
  
a.  What is the potential of public land leasing and sales (by the UDAs) as a revenue 
generating source in India’s cities, when compared to the total revenues and own 
source revenues of these city governments? 
b.  How can the UDA’s proceeds from land leasing and sales be realized by city 
governments, given that land is held by agencies different from the municipal 
authorities in many cases? Answers to this question are quite important since it 
means that infrastructure financing can become a much simpler process once the 
value of land is realized.  
c.  Are Indian cities more or less efficient than the Indian states in service 
provision? If the cities are more efficient, the case for transferring financial 
resources to them from the UDAs (which are state agencies) would be stronger, 
since they also represent local priorities and preferences in a much more 
effective manner, when compared with the distant national or state governments. 
 
This study is organized as follows. In order to understand the questions raised above, 
and to enable a response, the institutional arrangements for land use in India’s cities are 
described in Section 3. Section 4 then outlines the gaps in the literature after presenting 
a survey of the relevant literature. Section 5, on methodology,  explains the theory 
behind the stochastic frontier analysis used to examine the efficiency of Indian cities 
and that of the states, A  whilst Section 6 focuses on the findings from the potential of 
land as a revenue source for cities in India. Section 7 summarizes the findings from the 
stochastic frontier analysis for India’s cities and states, and presents implications for 
their efficiency in the provision of public services, taking the case of roads. Section 8 
summarizes the findings by presenting a synthesis, and draws policy implications for 
the transfer of revenues, rising beyond findings from the stochastic frontier analysis. 
Section 9 presents concluding remarks.  
3  Institutional arrangements for land use in India’s cities 
In India’s cities, urban development authorities (UDAs) hold substantial amounts of 
land as part of urban development projects. In new areas these UDAs acquire land under 
public purpose regulation, develop them with infrastructure networks, and then sell to 
developers and end-users. Once the capital costs of the projects are recovered, the 
UDAs typically hand over the developed parcels to the municipal government for their 
operation and maintenance. This is notwithstanding the several institutional overlaps 
that exist with respect to land use in India’s cities (see Sridhar 2006 for one such 
example taking the case of Ludhiana, India). 
  
However, the UDAs do not have municipal functions in the same way that the cities 
have. Cities in India are not free to dispose of land at will or commercially lease it. They   4
are, on the one hand, tied by ‘public purpose’ uses of their land such as the construction 
of schools and hospitals. Further, municipal authorities in India are also saddled with 
other municipal functions, such as sanitation and solid waste management, of their areas 
in addition to the provision of roads, street lighting, water supply and sewerage (in cases 
where the cities are mandated to provide it), quite in contrast to the UDAs which are 
required to provide only water supply, sewerage and roads in the areas which they 
develop.3 It is instructive to note that UDAs are not required to provide schools, 
hospitals, solid waste management or sanitation, which continues to be the 
responsibility of the city government.4 
 
Currently, in Indian cities some land is held by municipal corporations, revenues from 
the sale or lease of which accrue to them (and is classified under their ‘non-tax’ 
revenues). However, a substantial amount of land is held by UDAs in cities but their 
revenues do not accrue to the ULBs and hence is not accounted for in the ULB revenues 
reported by the various state finance commissions. 
  
While acknowledging the substantial variability in the revenue capacity of India’s cities, 
and fully understanding the exhaustible nature of land resources, in this study I explore 
the potential of land as a revenue source for municipalities, were the UDAs to transfer 
them to the city governments. I also examine the extent of city expenditures that can be 
                                                 
3 Below is the list of municipal functions mandated in the Twelfth Schedule of India’s 74
th Constitutional 
Amendment Act: 
1.  Urban planning including town planning. 
2.  Regulation of land-use and construction of buildings. 
3.  Planning for economic and social development. 
4.  Roads and bridges. 
5.  Water supply for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes. 
6.  Public health, sanitation conservancy and solid waste management. 
7.  Fire services. 
8.  Urban forestry, protection of the environment and promotion of ecological aspects. 
9.  Safeguarding the interests of weaker sections of society, including the handicapped and mentally 
retarded. 
10.  Slum improvement and upgradation. 
11.  Urban poverty alleviation. 
12.  Provision of urban amenities and facilities such as parks, gardens, playgrounds. 
13.  Promotion of cultural, educational and aesthetic aspects. 
14.  Burials and burial grounds; cremations, cremation grounds and electric crematoriums. 
15.  Cattle pounds; prevention of cruelty to animals. 
16.  Vital statistics including registration of births and deaths. 
17.  Public amenities including street lighting, parking lots, bus stops and public conveniences. 
18.  Regulation of slaughter houses and tanneries. 
4 As an instance, the UDA in Bangalore is the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) whose website 
(http://www.bdabangalore.org/) summarizes the planning and development functions of the BDA, which  
involve the following:  
* Preparation of development plan for Bangalore.  
* Preparation of scheme plans.  
* Approval of development plans for group housing and layouts.  
* Approval of building plans.  
* Other statutory functions under Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act of 1961.  
In addition to the planning functions, the BDA Act envisages the following development functions: 
* Planning and implementation of schemes to provide for residential, commercial and industrial sites, 
civic amenity sites, parks and playgrounds.  
* Construction of commercial complexes.  
* Construction of houses for economically weaker sections, low, middle and high-income groups.  
* Development of major infrastructure facilities.   5
potentially financed by these revenues. Next, I ascertain the efficiency of cities and that 
of the state governments in the provision of public services, given that UDAs are 
parastatal entities, to examine if the transfer of revenues to cities would be justified 
from an efficiency perspective. There could, of course, be other grounds for transferring 
revenues to cities from state agencies, such as equity, accountability and 
decentralization, which I do not examine in detail here. 
4  Gaps in the literature 
There is a lengthy literature on the efficiency of local governments as well as on the 
potential of land as a means of financing revenue. I summarize these streams of 
literature here and present the gaps at the end of this section. 
4.1  Literature on local government efficiency 
Studies which examine the efficiency of cities around the world abound. Afonso and 
Fernandes (2003) measure and analyse the expenditure efficiency of Portuguese local 
governments using a non-parametric technique for production frontier estimation 
(known as Free Disposal Hull). They construct an index of municipal performance and 
compute input and output efficiency scores for 51 Portuguese municipalities located in 
the Region of Lisbon and Vale do Tejo (RLVT) in order to estimate the extent of 
municipal spending that seems to be wasted relative to the best-practice frontier. The 
results of their empirical analysis suggest that RLVT municipalities could achieve, on 
average, roughly the same level of local output with about 39 per cent fewer resources, 
i.e. that local performance could be improved without necessarily increasing municipal 
spending. 
 
In Italy, as in other countries, recent legislative reforms aim at increasing the fiscal 
autonomy of local governments, in order to align spending with funding responsibility 
and, in this way, to improve both the efficiency and the effectiveness of public services 
provided to the citizens. Boetti, Piacenza and Turati (2009) assess spending efficiency 
for Italian municipalities, and investigate–in particular–the effects of fiscal 
decentralization, considering also the role played by electoral accountability of 
incumbent politicians. This analysis relies on a sample of 262 Italian municipalities and 
exploits parametric (SFA) and nonparametric (DEA) frontier techniques to study 
efficiency performances and their determinants. Consistent with fiscal federalism 
theories, their preliminary results suggested that more autonomous municipalities 
exhibit less inefficient spending behaviour. 
 
Bossert et al. (2003) investigate the relation between decentralization and equity of 
resource allocation in Colombia and Chile. Using a ‘decision space’ approach, they 
compare decentralization of the health systems of Columbia and Chile. Their evidence 
from Colombia and Chile suggests that decentralization, under certain conditions and 
with some specific policy mechanisms, can improve the equity of resource allocation. In 
these countries, they found that equitable levels of per capita financial allocations at the 
municipal level were achieved through different forms of decentralization—the use of 
allocation formulae, adequate local funding choices and horizontal equity funds. 
Findings on equity of utilization of services were less consistent, but they did show that   6
increased levels of funding were associated with increased utilization. This suggests that 
improved equity of funding over time might reduce inequities of service utilization. 
  
Da Motta and Moreira (2009) analyse how political and institutional factors affect the 
performance of municipalities in improving social welfare in Brazil during 1990-2000. 
Their model adopts a stochastic production frontier, conditioned by variables related to 
the costs of provision of services and those that can affect municipal efficiency. Their 
results indicated that one cannot reject: (1) economies of scale; (2) the effect of vote 
margin in the municipality and the type of mandate of the elected governor; and (3) that 
local politics and the existence of sectorial boards did not affect the level of efficiency 
for municipal spending. 
 
Loikkanen, Susiluoto and Funk (2011) study whether Finnish city managers’ 
characteristics and work environment, in addition to other external factors, explain 
differences in the cost efficiency of service provision in Finnish municipalities. In this 
paper, first, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is employed in calculating efficiency 
scores for municipalities. In DEA the outputs consist of six to ten volume indicators of 
services in health, social and education sectors. As the combined input, the cost of 
providing (either producing or buying) these services is used. Next, the DEA efficiency 
scores are explained with regression models. As external factors, they use variables 
which characterize the municipality, its location and its population. They found that the 
ten municipalities ranking highest in efficiency were rather small and located mostly in 
southern Finland. The biggest cities showed rather varying performance. Their 
regressions showed that peripheral location, large population and high unemployment 
reduced efficiency of municipal service provision. Dense urban structure, high 
education level of inhabitants, big share of middle aged municipal workers, narrow 
range of services and big share of purchases from the private sector or other 
municipalities increased efficiency. They found political variables and turnover in local 
elections did not explain efficiency differences. 
 
Holzer et al. (2009), based on their meta-analysis of studies of American municipalities, 
find that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between size and efficiency on a 
general level, with efficiency increasing with population sizes of up to about 25,000, 
which was stable until about 250,000 population, and declining with population after 
that. Thus their findings showed that the smallest and largest municipalities were the 
least efficient. However, the (inverted) U-shaped relationship they found was not the 
same for all service types. In capital-intensive services such as utility systems or public 
works, they found that increasing size was related to increased efficiency. For labour-
intensive services, such as police services, they found an increase in size was related to 
a decrease in efficiency−smaller units were more efficient than larger units. They also 
found that while the literature suggests that cost per capita may not be a good measure 
of efficiency or performance because of the distorting effect of other factors, studies use 
this measure commonly due to the absence of data on other measurable indicators. 
 
A major gap in the literature summarized above is that there are no studies relating to 
the efficiency of public service provision in India’s cities, possibly due to the lack of 
adequate disaggregated municipal data that could throw light on relevant aspects of 
service provision.   7
4.2  Literature on land leasing and sales 
This section summarizes the literature on evidence from using land leasing and sales to 
finance urban infrastructure provision. Land asset sales are attractive as a way to 
mobilize investment resources and land leasing and sales have been time tested in other 
countries. This has been documented in the literature. In the aftermath of Proposition 
13, which froze property tax assessments in the state of California, USA, California’s 
localities turned to land assets as a means of financing infrastructure. Such a 
phenomenon is not restricted to developed countries alone. The city of Bratislava, 
Slovakia, financed about 15 per cent of its annual capital budget from privatization 
proceeds. 
  
Deng (2005) points out that in China, it was only in 1988 that the Constitution was 
amended and in 1990 was the ground lease system formally approved by the central 
government; the nation-wide adoption of public land leasing started in 1992. The paper 
finds that without public land leasing, local public goods are completely capitalized in 
wages. Deng finds that public land leasing is Pareto improving because it eliminates 
free riding on the consumption of local public goods and establishes the link of rent 
capitalization. It also helps to shift local government’s role from a production manager 
to public goods provider. 
 
Peterson (2007) presents evidence that many cities in China have financed more than 
half of their urban infrastructure investment from land leasing, while borrowing against 
the value of land on their balance sheets to finance much of the remainder. As Chan 
(1997) points out, most of land leasing revenues were assigned to municipal 
governments (in the ratio 5:95 (5 per cent to central government and 95 per cent to local 
government)) as part of the 1994 fiscal reforms. Chreod (2005) points out that several 
municipalities studied in the World Bank’s City Development Strategies had freed up 
land for resale in the urban centre by moving their city hall and other related municipal 
buildings to a new location outside the urban centre and auctioned the vacated land to 
developers. Hong (1996) found that the Hong Kong Government captured about 39 per 
cent of the land-value increments occurring between 1970 and 1991 from land leased in 
the 1970s. More importantly, the captured value financed 55 per cent of the average 
annual infrastructure investment between 1970 and 1991. 
 
The evidence regarding Ethiopia which recently introduced land leasing as a financing 
device for cities is from Peterson (2007). Except for water tariffs, which some regions 
allow municipalities to adjust in the light of service costs, land leasing is the only source 
of revenue over which municipalities have policy control. Ethiopian policy, by 
specifying that a municipality shall earmark 90 per cent of all land-leasing proceeds for 
infrastructure investment, ties revenues from land leasing directly to municipal 
infrastructure investment. 
  
Peterson (2007) also presents evidence from India, focusing on land sales and auctions 
by the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (MMRDA). The 
startling finding is that sales from MMRDA land auctions in just one complex (Bandra-
Kurla complex) in January 2006 was a staggering ₹23 billion, which was two times 
more than the total infrastructure investment made by the Mumbai Municipal 
Corporation, during 2004-05 (which was only ₹10.4 billion) and four times more than 
MMRDA’s own infrastructure investment in 2004-05 which was a mere ₹5.4 billion.   8
Indeed, Vision Mumbai by Bombay First and McKinsey (2003) identifies land sales as 
one of the most important components in the public sector’s contribution to 
infrastructure financing. 
  
One may also ask how land can be made a part of overall financing. Here some 
international comparison of institutional structures where land financing is used 
extensively is helpful. Table 1 presents several such examples from around the world 
where land leases/sales are a significant mode of financing urban infrastructure. The 
startling evidence presented in Table 1 indeed shows that land is not an asset in any city 
that can be overlooked or ignored for its potential as a financing tool. 
Table 1: Selected cases of land-based financing in developing countries 
Location and activity  Amount and use of proceeds Comparative magnitude 
Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt: 
Auction of desert land for New 
Cities (May 2007, 2,100 hectares) 
$3.12 billion, to be used to 
reimburse costs of internal 
infrastructure and 
build highway connecting to Cairo 
Ring Road 
117 times total urban property tax 
collections in country; equal to 
10% of national government 
Revenue 
Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt: 
Private installation of “public” 
infrastructure in return for 
developable land (2005–present) 
$1.45 billion of private 
infrastructure investment, plus 7% 
of serviced land turned over to 
government for moderate-income 
housing 
Will provide infrastructure for a 
range of basic services covering 
more than 3,300 hectares of 
newly developed land, without 
financial cost to government 
Mumbai, India: Auction of 
financial centre land (Jan. 2006, 
Nov. 2007, 13 hectares) by 
Mumbai Metropolitan Regional 
Development Authority 
(MMRDA) 
$1.2 billion, to be used primarily to 
finance projects in Mumbai’s 
metropolitan transportation plan 
10 times MMRDA’s total capital 
spending in fiscal 2005; 3.5 times 
total value of municipal bonds 
issued by all urban local bodies 
and local utilities in India since 
1995 
Bangalore, India: Planned sale 
of excess land to finance access 
highway to new airport built under 
public-private partnership 
$500+ million. On hold; land will 
be used instead for ministry 
buildings and government-built 
industrial space 
Minimum sale proceeds were 
projected to considerably exceed 
costs of highway construction and 
acquisition of right-of-way 
Istanbul, Turkey: Sale of old 
municipal bus station and 
former administrative site 
(Mar. and Apr. 2007) 
$1.5 billion in auction proceeds, to 
be dedicated to capital investment 
budgets 
Total municipal capital spending in 
fiscal 2005 was $994 million. 
Municipal borrowing for 
infrastructure investment in 2005 
was $97 million 
Cape Town, South Africa: Sale 
of Victoria & Albert Waterfront 
property by Transnet, the national 
transportation authority (Nov. 
2006). 
$1.0 billion, to be used to 
recapitalize Transnet and support 
nationwide investment in core 
transport infrastructure. 
Sale proceeds exceeded 
Transnet’s total capital spending in 
fiscal 2006; equal to 17% of 5-year 




$1.0 billion collected in 1997–
2007, and $1.1 billion planned for 
2008–15, for financing city street 
and bridge improvement program 
Betterment fees finance 50% of 
street and bridge improvements. 
Other planned sources of 
financing: $50 million International 
Finance Corporation loan; $300 
million international, peso-linked 
bond issue 
Source: Peterson (2009). 
 
What is missing indeed is the fact that apart from anecdotal evidence, no systematic 
studies have been conducted to evaluate the collective potential of land in India’s cities, 
given India has more than 30 cities with million plus population and more than 5,000 
cities and towns, even as of 2001. Specifically, no studies have looked at the potential of 
land as a revenue generating source in India’s municipalities or have examined the 
efficiency of their service provision. 
  
Based on the literature survey presented here, I then find two major gaps:   9
  
1.  There are no credible studies which examine the efficiency of Indian city 
governments and that of the Indian states in the provision of public services; 
2.  No papers examine systematically the role played by innovative sources such as 
public land leasing/sales in financing India’s cities, probably due to the lack of 
centralized data. 
 
In this study, I examine the revenue stream from land in a sample of four large Indian 
cities over a ten-year period to assess its contribution to municipal finances. In the next 
step, based on data from more than 2,000 cities in India, I examine the efficiency of 
Indian cities and the Indian states with respect to service provision taking the case of 
one important local public service, roads, to assess whether transfer of revenues (from 
land leasing and/or sales) to urban local bodies (city governments) would be justified. 
5 Methodology 
Since comprehensive municipal budgets are not released to the public in any developing 
country including India (where some cities put their budgets in the public domain), it is 
difficult to put together reliable data on the magnitude of land leasing/sales except 
through case studies. Given the sparse research in this emerging area, data on revenues 
from land leasing and sales realized by the UDAs and municipal corporations in India 
and on other aspects of municipal finances are gathered through field visits to selected 
million-plus cities in India. I then compare the UDA revenues from land leasing /sales 
with cities’ total revenues, own source revenues and actual expenditures. For India’s 
cities, I start from Urban Local Bodies’ (ULBs) revenues and suggest to this an 
increment that could result from the potential of land sales and leases by UDAs as an 
addition to existing municipal revenues. I also hypothetically compute what proportion 
of city expenditures can potentially be financed by UDA revenues from land leasing 
and/or sales. 
 
In the next step, using a large secondary data set of India’s cities published by the 
Census of India town directories, I estimate the efficiency of Indian city governments 
and that of the Indian states, to examine if the transfer of revenues from land leasing and 
sales to the cities would be justified from the viewpoint of efficiency in public service 
delivery, taking the case of roads.5 I take the case of roads since that is a public service 
provided by states as well as city governments in India.6 I use stochastic frontier 
analysis to estimate the efficiency of city and state governments in India with respect to 
the provision of public services. 
                                                 
5 However, as mentioned earlier, the caveat is that an attempt is made in this paper to understand only the 
efficiency of cities, not examining in detail other aspects that might justify local government intervention. 
6 On the other hand, there are certain services which are offered just by local governments such as 
sanitation and solid waste management over which the states have no mandate. There are also some 
services such as fire protection which are offered by the states, not by local governments, hence, the 
provision of roads are comparable across the states and local governments.   10
5.1  Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
While ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates the mean of the dependent 





th), not the maximum or minimum. Limited 
dependent variable models truncate the dependent variable into categories or limits, but 
not the maximum or minimum. It is important for us to understand what lessons the 
maximum and minimum teach, and use that in analysis, sharing of best practices and 
policy-making. Frontier functions estimate maxima or minima of a dependent variable 
given explanatory variables, usually to estimate production or cost functions. 
  
Having said that, why is SFA chosen over Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) in this 
study? It is instructive to note that DEA utilizes linear programming to fit a boundary 
function to observed data for a sample of relatively homogeneous firms is deterministic, 
distribution free and allows the data to ‘speak for themselves’. It should be noted that 
DEA is favoured only where measurement error is unlikely to pose much of a threat and 
where the assumptions of neoclassical production theory are in question. SFA has the 
advantage in coping with measurement error and where simple functional forms provide 
a close match to the properties of the underlying production technology (Mortimer 
2002). One should note that DEA is usually thought to be less accurate and more erratic 
at ‘corner points’ where few, if any, observations are available to provide a reliable 
standard of comparison in estimating the best-practice frontier. 
  
Given the fact that measurement error is frequently encountered in real time data, and a 
stochastic rather than a deterministic analysis is preferred, SFA is used for determining 
the efficiency of India’s city governments and that of the state governments in this 
study. 
 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis has its starting point in the stochastic production frontier 
models introduced by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977). 
 
The production frontier model without a random component is written as: 
 
yi  = f (xi, β) . TEi            ( 1 )  
 
where yi is the observed scalar output of the producer (in our case, the state or city 
government i), xi is a vector of N inputs that determine the city (or state government) i’s 
output, f(xi, β) is the production frontier, and β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. 
TEi in equation (1) denotes technical efficiency defined as the ratio of observed output 
to maximum feasible output. TEi = 1 shows that the i-th firm (state or city government) 
obtains the maximum feasible output, while TEi < 1 provides a measure of the shortfall 
of the observed output from maximum feasible output. 
 
In the next step, a stochastic component that describes random shocks affecting the 
‘production process,’ is added to equation (1). These shocks are not directly attributable 
to the city or state government or the underlying technology. These shocks may come 
from weather changes, economic adversities or other factors. These effects are denoted 
with exp {vi}. Each state or city government faces a different shock, but the shocks are 
assumed to be random and are described by a common distribution.   11
With the introduction of the random component, the stochastic production frontier 
becomes: 
 
yi  = f (xi, β) . TEi . exp {vi}         ( 2 )  
 
Since we do not know anything about the relative efficiencies of the units, it is assumed 
that TEi is a stochastic variable, with a specific distribution function, common to all 
state or city governments. It is written as an exponential TEi  = exp {-ui}, where ui ≥ 0, 
since  TEi  ≤ 1 . Substituting for the overall random component and for technical 
efficiency, the following equation is obtained: 
 
yi  = f (xi, β) . TEi . exp {-ui}. exp {vi}      ( 3 )  
 
If f(xi, β) takes the double-log form, the model in (3) can be written as: 
 
ln yi  = β0 + ∑n βn ln xin + vi-ui        (4) 
 
where  vi is the “noise” component, which is considered as a two-sided, normally 
distributed variable, and ui is the non-negative technical inefficiency component. 
Together they constitute a compound error term, with a specific distribution to be 
determined. 
5.2 Empirical  work 
For purposes of the research on addition to city revenues from UDA land leasing and 
sales, four million-plus cities in India–Bangalore, Jaipur, Ahmedabad and Kolkata–that 
are representative of a variety of characteristics, were chosen. This sample of cities is 
geographically far flung enough to be representative of several regions in the country. 
They are also from a variety of states experiencing different stages of economic growth. 
Bangalore and Ahmedabad are located in fast growing states, whereas Jaipur and 
Kolkata are in the relatively slower growing regions of the country.7 
 
For purposes of examining the efficiency question, I choose all cities (5,000+ cities) on 
which data were available from the 2001 Census of India town directory. At the time the 
research for this study was completed, the Census of India had not yet published 
analogous data for the cities for 2011. For examining efficiency at the state level, I 
chose all the 29 Indian states and 6 union territories to estimate their efficiency of 
service provision, taking the case of roads. 
                                                 
7 See Sridhar and Reddy (2010) for a justification of why choice of these cities would make sense. The 
size of these cities is diverse enough to be representative of a wide variety of urban areas across the 
country. While Bangalore and Kolkata are metropolitan (with their population being greater than five 
million) where big ticket land transactions have been taking place, Ahmedabad and Jaipur are million-
plus cities, which are medium-sized when compared with the other. Moreover, Jaipur is in Rajasthan 
where municipalities, particularly the smaller ones, derive a large proportion of their revenues from land 
leasing and sales. This sample also represents a variety of fiscal arrangements in cities used by them for 
financing their expenditures. Ahmedabad in Gujarat continued to have the octroi at the time of finishing 
the field visits for the land leasing part, whereas the other cities are in states that have long since 
abolished the octroi.    12
6  Public land leasing and sales as a source of revenue: Findings from selected 
Indian cities  
In this section the focus is on finances of the municipalities and the UDAs primarily 
from the viewpoint of land. It is instructive to note that the Ahmedabad city government 
continued to levy octroi at the time the data were gathered on land leasing and sales 
(2008). As Bangalore, Jaipur and Kolkata abolished the octroi, the property tax is their 
most important source of revenue. In the case of each of these Indian cities, I highlight 
the potential of UDA land revenues as a proportion of the city’s total and own source 
revenues. Such a presentation enables us to make a realistic assessment of the potential 
of land in the context of the existing revenue structures in place in these cities. I provide 
a hypothetical profile of municipal expenditures financed by revenues from land leasing 
and sales, before examining the efficiency of Indian city and state governments in the 
provision of public services. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the potential of land as a revenue option (as a proportion of own 
source revenues) for all the selected Indian cities, putting together the various 
hypothetical computations that were performed. On average, Ahmedabad and Kolkata 
city governments can realize only about 6 and 12 per cent respectively of their total own 
source revenues from their respective UDAs’ sale and lease of land. In the case of the 
other cities, this is much higher, being nearly 39 per cent of the Bangalore city 
government’s own source revenues and nearly 10 times more, i.e. being 390 per cent of 
own source revenues in the case of the Jaipur city government. 
Table 2: Potential of revenues from UDAs’ land leasing and/or sales as a proportion of city 
government’s own source revenues (%) 
Year Ahmedabad  Kolkata  Jaipur  Bangalore  Average 
1998-99 0.86  5.42  NA  NA  3.14 
1999-2000 0.75  5.48  NA  NA  3.11 
2000-01 3.94  2.32  255.71  NA  80.47 
2001-02 2.69  10.43  243.65  NA  70.98 
2002-03 6.84  8.85  200.48  61.73  63.46 
2003-04 6.29  4.13  352.16  45.85  98.25 
2004-05 7.43  8.74  257.37  29.03  71.32 
2005-06 10.99  14.65  544.47  25.57  105.27 
2006-07 19.41  52.22  592.26  39.82  141.97 
2007-08 1.10  12.31  672.00  32.26  108.37 
Average 6.03  12.46  389.76  39.04  89.46 
Std. Deviation  5.78  14.48  184.66  13.34  33.67 
Maximum 19.41  52.22  672.00  61.73  147.44 
Minimum 0.75  2.32  200.48  25.57  51.26 
Sources: Various municipal corporations, UDAs, and author’s computations. 
 
Table 3: Potential of revenues from UDAs’ land leasing and/or sales as a proportion of city 
governments’ total revenues (%) 
Year  Ahmedabad Jaipur  Kolkata  Bangalore Average 
1998-99 0.70    NA 3.40  NA  2.10 
1999-2000 0.60    NA  3.30 NA  2.00 
2000-01 3.20  60.65  1.60  NA  21.80 
2001-02 2.20  73.63  6.60  NA  27.50   13
2002-03 5.60  67.40  6.00  51.90  32.80 
2003-04 5.20  89.14  3.20  41.50  34.80 
2004-05 6.40  70.18  5.50  26.50  27.20 
2005-06 9.60  170.39  9.20  21.90  52.80 
2006-07 16.70 247.12  23.40  28.30  78.90 
2007-08 0.90  191.39  6.30  20.50  54.70 
Average 5.11  121.24  6.85  31.77  33.46 
Maximum 16.70  247.12  23.40  51.90 78.90 
Minimum 0.60  60.65  1.60  20.50  2.00 
Std.Dev 5.01  71.37  6.22  12.36  23.75 
Sources: Various municipal corporations, UDAs, and author’s computations. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the contribution of UDAs’ land leasing and sales to municipal 
corporations’ (city governments’) total revenues for the four cities. Jaipur is the one 
with above average additions to total revenues, with Bangalore coming out second. On 
average, taking all cities into account, revenue from land lease and/or sale by UDAs 
accounts for nearly 90 per cent of existing own source revenues of municipal 
corporations (Table 2), and 33 per cent of their total revenues (Table 3).  
 
Next, the structure of own source revenues of the city governments was examined. 
Table 4 summarizes per capita municipal own source revenues in the selected cities. 
The table shows that from a self-reliance perspective, Ahmedabad is the richest city 
government of all, followed by Bangalore and Kolkata. The poorest is Jaipur, which 
explains its success with land leasing and sales. Tables 5 and 6 summarize respectively 
the per capita revenues in each of the municipal corporations and UDAs from land 
leasing and sales, which are a direct outcome of the institutional arrangements for land 
use in the cities versus the UDAs. 
Table 4: Per capita own source revenues, city governments (₹) 
Year  Ahmedabad  Kolkata   Jaipur    Bangalore  
1998-99 1404.98  787.02  NA  NA 
1999-2000 1641.04  933.49  NA  NA 
2000-01 1598.21  1451.66  154.77  NA 
2001-02 1564.22  1114.83  187.40  NA 
2002-03 1679.74  1422.82  195.71  1393.38 
2003-04 1846.82  2623.50  128.71  1816.44 
2004-05 2114.97  1708.23  156.07  2235.36 
2005-06 2317.43  1736.94  250.27  1784.71 
2006-07 3010.23  1803.82  401.23  1955.23 
2007-08 3322.13  2234.69  315.11  2398.51 
Average 2,049.98 1,581.70  223.66  1,930.60 
Maximum 3,322.13  2,623.50  401.23  2398.51 
Minimum  1,404.98  787.02 128.71 1393.38 
Std.Dev 651.31  568.92  93.37  356.47 
Sources: Various municipal corporations and author’s computations. 
Table 5: Per capita revenues from municipal corporations’ land leasing and/or sales (₹) 
Year  Ahmedabad   Kolkata   Jaipur   Bangalore  
1998-99 0.24  0.08  NA  NA 
1999-2000 2.38  0.91  NA  NA   14
2000-01 13.16  0.69  4.97  NA 
2001-02 13.22  0.37  9.7  NA 
2002-03 10.86  15.79  11.98  1.73 
2003-04 7.88  2.85  16.88  0.99 
2004-05 15.59  15.32  27.59  10.92 
2005-06 8.36  6.73  25.8  4.47 
2006-07 5.10  2.57  86.32  1.12 
2007-08 42.53  5.93  54.35  0.34 
Average 11.93  5.12  29.70  3.26 
Maximum 42.53  15.79  86.32  10.92 
Minimum 0.24  0.08  4.97  0.34 
Std.Dev 11.82  5.94  27.58  4.02 
Sources: Various municipal corporations and author’s computations.   15
Table 6: Per capita revenues from UDAs’ land leasing and/or sales (₹) 
Year  Ahmedabad  Kolkata   Jaipur   Bangalore  
1998-99 12.11  42.67  126.73  76.59 
1999-2000 12.23  51.14  204.14  101.79 
2000-01 62.94  33.73  395.76  402.49 
2001-02 42.13  116.28  456.61  483.51 
2002-03 114.92  125.88  392.37  860.20 
2003-04 116.10  108.22  453.26  832.78 
2004-05 157.16  149.34  401.69  648.95 
2005-06 254.80  254.53  1,362.67 456.36 
2006-07 584.21  941.93  2,376.32 778.67 
2007-08 36.66  275.15  2,117.53 773.75 
Average 139.33  209.89  828.71  541.51 
Maximum 584.21 941.93  2,376.32 860.20 
Minimum 12.11 33.73  126.73  76.59 
Std.Dev 173.48  270.01  820.82  288.21 
Sources: Various UDAs and author’s computations. 
 
As Table 5 shows, while city governments’ revenues from land leasing and sales are 
low compared with that for the UDAs (Table 6) (recall the ‘public purposes’ to which 
city governments have to use their land primarily for), the clear winner, even when the 
municipality’s revenues from land leasing and sales are examined, is Jaipur, which 
earns nearly ₹30 per capita from land leasing and sales, on average, followed by 
Ahmedabad (at INF12 per capita), with Kolkata and Bangalore trailing, as far as 
average per capita municipal revenues from land leasing and sales are concerned. 
 
Table 6, which summarizes UDAs’ per capita revenues from land leasing and sales, 
confirms that revenues from land leasing and sales for UDAs are much higher than they 
are for city governments. Per capita revenues are the highest in Jaipur followed by 
Bangalore, with Kolkata and Ahmedabad trailing. 
 
Summarizing, our findings based on municipality revenues and UDA revenues from 
land leasing and sales suggest two groups of cities: one set which is able to capitalize on 
land for raising revenues (Jaipur and Bangalore) and the other which is unable to do so 
(Kolkata and Ahmedabad). These city types are representative of many one finds in the 
country, some of which are capitalizing on land value increases, and some of which are 
unable to lease or sell land, due to various constraints. 
6.1  Making sense of the discrepancies across cities in the potential of land 
A systematic investigation was performed of the causes of these discrepancies across 
cities in terms of the potential of land as a revenue generating source. One reason could 
be the institutional arrangements for land use in the cities. For instance, in the case of 
Kolkata, it was found that the funds transferred by developers into the UDA (KMDA’s) 
escrow account are not taken into account in the UDA revenues from land leasing and 
sales there. This could be one reason why Kolkata comes a distant third in terms of 
KMDA’s contribution to the municipality (KMC’s) revenues. In the case of Ahmedabad 
(AUDA), its inability to make money out of land leasing and sales seems to arise due to 
constraints imposed on it by the Gujarat Town Planning Act which specifies reservation 
to the extent of 10 per cent of land for providing housing to the socially and   16
economically weaker sections, 15 per cent for roads, 5 per cent for parks, playgrounds 
and open space, 5 per cent for social infrastructure such as schools, dispensaries, fire 
brigade, and only 15 per cent for sale by the authority for residential, commercial or 
industrial use depending on the nature of development. 
 
In the case of Jaipur, it is worth noting that the sale of land is an important source of 
non–tax income for municipalities in Rajasthan, particularly for the smaller 
municipalities. According to the report of Rajasthan’s First State Finance Commission, 
sale of lands accounts for, in the aggregate, 8–9 per cent of the total income of 
municipalities, and it could be as high as 15–16 per cent of the income of smaller 
municipalities. For city governments (municipal corporations), however, land sales are 
not an important source of income on account of their limited jurisdiction over lands 
and other land–related assets, as one observes in the case of Jaipur. In all municipal 
corporations, Urban Improvement Trusts (UITs) hold the statutory responsibility for 
matters relating to lands. Thus in the case of Rajasthan, the poor financial position of 
the city governments, and the lack of an adequate tax base (due to the abolition of octroi 
in 1998) has led to attempts on the part of municipalities to improve their other sources 
of income. Land lease and sales are the most important of these. 
  
Another reason why the impact is huge in Jaipur is because the city government’s own 
source revenues are quite low, compared with the UDA’s revenues from land leasing 
and sales. However, in contrast, the revenues of Ahmedabad and the Kolkata city 
governments are huge compared to those from the respective UDA revenues from land 
leasing and sales. Hence the impact of the additional revenues from UDAs in 
Ahmedabad and Kolkata is muted. 
 
In the case of Jaipur, while the revenues from its UDA (JDA) have been fairly stable, 
there is substantial variability in the revenues of the Jaipur city government, hence there 
is variability in the proportion UDA revenues account for out of the city’s revenues. 
 
In the case of Bangalore, corner sites are sold off by the UDA (the BDA) through 
auction which yields revenues much higher than the price at which plots are sold in 
Ahmedabad by the UDA. This explains Bangalore’s relatively higher revenues from 
land lease compared with that in Ahmedabad. In the case of Bangalore the city 
government thus far has not used land as a revenue generating source, except for 
charitable purposes. But the UDA there has been relatively more prolific in its use of 
land for revenue generation. 
 
Summarizing the reasons for the discrepancies found across the Indian cities with 
respect to the ability of land lease and sales as a revenue generating mechanism, one 
answer lies in the institutional arrangements for land use and the mechanisms used to 
transfer the revenues from the developers to the UDAs. Another reason could be the 
relative financial strength of the city government vis-à-vis that of the UDA. Yet another 
reason could be the land disposal process itself–usually auctioned off plots or sites are 
sold at a premium when compared to other sites. 
 
The next section makes an attempt to answer the second question which was raised in 
this study which is, to understand the expenditure patterns of the city governments 
based on revenues from the UDAs.   17
6.2  Hypothetical computation of city expenditures 
It was found that most of the revenues of the UDAs are spent on capital projects, hence 
the resources from land leasing and sales are being used for developing infrastructure of 
some sort. The discussions during field visits also confirmed that there is enough local 
autonomy, at least on paper, for spending limited resources (i.e. funds up to a ceiling) as 
seen by the existence of local representatives on committees appointed to approve 
spending decisions. Table 7 summarizes what proportion of the capital expenditure, in 
each of the cities, revenues from land leasing and sales in each city’s UDA can be 
expected to finance.  
Table 7: Hypothetical proportion of city capital expenditures financed by UDA revenues from 
land leasing and sales (%) 
Year   Ahmedabad   Kolkata   Jaipur   Bangalore   Average, all cities 
1998-99  5.05  62.68 NA  18.00 28.58 
1999-2000  2.21  54.82 NA  22.45 26.49 
2000-01  16.27  38.25 193.96  21.92 67.60 
2001-02  8.90  306.26 194.18 120.27 157.40 
2002-03  30.61  132.69 189.72 144.17 124.30 
2003-04 17.84  35.74  257.90  141.92  113.35 
2004-05  31.52  30.94 207.12  90.48 90.02 
2005-06  54.52  45.97 441.32  54.07 148.97 
2006-07 64.36  120.05  730.09  65.02  244.88 
2007-08 3.03  23.75  382.76  NA  136.51 
Average    23.43  85.12 324.63  75.37 113.81 
Maximum    64.36  306.26 730.09 144.17 244.88 
Minimum    2.21  23.75 189.72  18.00 26.49 
Std.Deviation    21.75  86.07 189.72  51.13 65.43 
Sources: city corporations, UDAs and author’s computations. 
 
On average, if UDA revenues from land leasing and sales were to be transferred to 
cities, they can expect to finance more than 100 per cent (in some cases more than 200 
per cent) of the cities’ capital expenditures. So it is clear that UDA revenues from land 
leasing and sales are a very promising way of financing much needed city capital 
expenditures in Indian cities. 
  
However, the issue of contention is one of examining the efficiency of city governments 
and that of the state governments in the provision of public services, should UDA 
revenues be transferred to them. This is the issue to which I turn in the next section. 
7  Efficiency of Indian cities and states 
As described earlier, one aspect of the transfer of revenues from UDAs to city 
governments, i.e. efficiency, was examined. In order to understand whether cities are 
more efficient (rather than UDAs which are parastatal entities, or agencies of the state), 
and whether the transfers of revenues from land leasing and sales to the cities from the   18
UDAs would be at all efficient from a public service delivery viewpoint, stochastic 
frontier models were estimated separately for the Indian cities and states. For purposes 
of modelling, I narrowed the scope of the analysis to a specific indicator of a public 
service, namely provision of roads, since they are required to be provided both by local 
governments and the states.8  
7.1  Empirical model, data sources and variable definitions 
The literature (Ingram and Liu 1999; Kalb 2010) has used road length per capita as the 
measure of road provision as dependent on population, per capita income, and 
population density. As this literature points out, knowledge about the recent trends in 
road provision and its relation to income, population, and settlement patterns is a useful 
guide to future road provision and an important input to transport policy making. 
  
Following this literature, and understanding that city-level income estimates are not 
available for Indian cities, I define the cross-sectional city-level efficiency model for 
city i as follows, according to equation (4) which is used to denote a stochastic frontier 
model for city i: 
 
Road length per 1,000 populationi = β0 + β1i population + β2i population density + β3i 
city revenue per capita + ε           ( 5 )  
 
The road length in city i is defined as the ratio of sum of pucca and kuccha road length 
(in kilometres)9 to the city’s population (in thousands). Population is measured in actual 
numbers and population density refers to persons per square kilometre of land area. The 
city’s revenue is the total revenues of the city government (consisting of own source 
revenues (tax and non-tax revenues) and grants). This is divided by population to arrive 
at revenue per capita. The source of data for all city-level variables is the Census of 
India 2001 town directories which are a rich source of information regarding various 
aspects of the city’s demographics, public services and finances. 
 
While the literature has found that population size has a positive impact on road 
provision in the context of developed countries, this may not be true in the context of 
developing countries, which usually have inadequate urban road infrastructure in 
relation to needs. Population density can be expected to have a negative impact on road 
length since an increase in population density usually results in greater space being 
occupied by houses and other infrastructure, like buildings, implying less space for 
roads. Conversely, lesser population density implies more space available for roads. 
Higher revenue per capita, used as an indicator for measuring the city’s household 
income, should translate into greater road length, assuming that all city governments 
have access to similar technology for constructing roads. The advantage of using 
revenue per capita is also that, one would know whether increasing revenues (through 
                                                 
8 I made an attempt to examine if it is possible to get data on road length of the UDAs versus that of the 
cities. I called the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, and the Ministry of Urban Development, 
Government of India, to discuss about the feasibility of separating out the UDA road length from that of 
the cities, but that did not seem feasible at the time I was completing the work. 
9 Pucca roads are made of stone or proper (fired) tiles (not mud tiles). Kuccha roads are made of less 
permanent material like grass, straw and wood.   19
land leasing and sales from the UDAs) would increase the efficiency of road provision 
by cities. 
 
The state-level cross-sectional model for technical efficiency is specified as follows, 
following the literature, and consistent with the city-level efficiency model: 
 
Road length per 1,000 populationj = α0 + α 1j population + α 2j population density + α 3j state 
income per capita + ε         ( 6 )  
 
The road length, population and population density at the state level (states are denoted 
by j in equation (6)) are defined in the same way as they are in the case of cities. Data 
on road length, population and population density for the states are from the Ministry of 
Road Transport and Highways, Government of India.10 The state income per capita is 
measured by the net state domestic product per capita (in constant 1999-2000 prices), 
and is obtained from the national accounts division of India’s Central Statistical 
Organization (CSO).11 
8 Findings 
Summary statistics for relevant variables are reported for the city and state samples. 
Table 8 summarizes the relevant variables included in the model for the city efficiency 
model and Table 9 does this for the state-level variables. 
  
Table 8 is based on data from the Census of India town directories of 2001 for all the 
5,161 towns of India. On average, the road length per 1,000 population is 269 km, with 
wide variations such as a maximum of 20,476.62 km (in Kanam, Tamil Nadu) to a low 
of 0.02 km per 1,000 population (Dallo Pura, Delhi). Given all towns are included, the 
largest city is Mumbai (12 million as of 2001) and the smallest is Vas (in Gujarat) with 
a population 338 persons. The most dense is Jhabrera in Uttarakhand (with a population 
density of 104,266.7 persons per sq km of land area) and the least dense is Hajira 
(Gujarat) (at only 41 persons per sq km of its land area). 
Table 8: Summary statistics, relevant variables, Indian cities 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Population density  5,137  4,424.87  5,919.72  41.00  104,266.70 
City revenue per 
capita (₹)  4,060  3.54 53.57 0.01  2,588.26 
Road length per 
1,000  population 4,437  268.80 1,384.60  0.02  20,476.62 
Population 5,177 55,245.54 252,458.20 338.00  12,000,000.00
Source: Census of India town directories 2001 and author’s computations. 
 
The richest city government measured in terms of revenue per capita (₹2,588.26) is 
Gakulgar in the northeastern state of Tripura. The poorest city governments are in 
several states, mostly in Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, but also in Rajasthan, Bihar and 
Nagaland, Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh, Manipur, and relatively prosperous states such as 
Maharashtra. 
                                                 
10 http://www.morth.nic.in 
11 http://mospi.nic.in   20
 
Table 9 summarizes the relevant efficiency variables at the state level used in the state 
model specified in equation (6). The roads, population and population density are based 
on data from the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways for 2001 for all the 29 states 
and 6 union territories in the country. Although more recent data are available for the 
state roads, in order to compare them with the municipal roads (whose data are for 
2001), 2001 data are used for the state roads. On average, the road length per 1,000 
population at the state level is only 3.83 km, compared with nearly an average of 269 
km (per 1,000 population) for the cities (Table 8). One observes the low coverage of 
population with state roads because state roads include rural areas as well, where the 
road density is lower than in the urban areas. Cities on the other hand have relatively 
higher coverage with roads. The maximum road coverage of population is in Arunachal 
Pradesh (at 16.72 km of road per 1,000 population). The state with least coverage of 
roads is Jharkhand (at 0.37 km of roads per 1,000 population). Uttar Pradesh is the most 
populous state (with a population of 166 million as of 2001) and the smallest is Sikkim, 
a northeastern state (with a population of 540,891). The most dense state is Delhi (at 
9,339 persons per sq km of land area) and the least dense is Arunachal Pradesh, which is 
one reason explaining the high coverage of its population with roads. If one were to 
examine net state domestic product (at constant 1999-2000 prices), the richest state 
(with a per capita NSDP of ₹48,292) is the union territory, Chandigarh, which is the 
capital of both Punjab and Haryana, two high-income states. The poorest state is Bihar 
as of 2001 (at a per capita net state domestic product of ₹6,554) (in constant 1999-2000 
prices).  
Table 9: Summary statistics, relevant variables, Indian states 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Population density  30  865.51  2130.26  13.11  9339.52 
Per capita net state 
domestic product (₹ in 
constant 1999-2000 prices)  32  18,831.81  9,512.57  6,554  48,292 
Road length per 1,000 
population 30  3.83  3.22  0.37  16.72 
Population 32  34,200,000 38,400,000  540,851  166,000,000 
Source: Central Statistical Organization (for NSDP), Ministry of Road Transport and Highways for road 
length and population and author’s computations. State highways are also included. 
 
Table 10: Maximum likelihood estimates of Stochastic Frontier Analysis, India’s cities 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard error  z  P>z      
Log of population  -0.31  0.03  -9.35  0.00 
Log of population 
density 
-0.37 0.04  -10.24  0.00 
Log of city revenue per 
capita 
0.08 0.02  3.34  0.00 
Constant 6.70  0.40 16.77  0.00 
σv                            1.32 0.02  55.40  0.00 






v  3.7274       0.0885     
λ=σu/σv    0.0033     0.2837                         
Note: Dependent variable: road length per 1,000 population. Log likelihood = -7366.3903  Prob > chi2 = 
0.0000. Observations=3,547.  
Source: Census of India town directories 2001 and author’s computations. 
   21
Table 10 summarizes results from the city-level efficiency model (assuming a half-
normal distribution for inefficiency).12 It shows that city population has a negative and 
significant impact on road length per 1,000 population, which implies that bigger cities 
have lower road length in relation to their needs, which is to be expected in a 
developing country with typically overburdened infrastructure. Population density has a 
negative and a statistically significant impact on road length, consistent with past 
literature on this, and showing that higher population densities, far from having scale 
economies, thwart the build-up of urban infrastructure such as roads. While past cross-
sectional studies find an elasticity of road length with respect to population density, of 
up to -1, a much lower elasticity is found, 0.4 (in absolute value), although this elasticity 
for urban roads is higher than at the state level (where this elasticity is only 0.3, see 
Table 11). As one would expect, city revenue per capita has a positive impact on road 
length, although with an elasticity of less than 0.1. This means that revenues from land 
leasing and sales would have a positive impact on the city’s provision of roads, although 
a proportionate increase in the city’s per capita revenue increases road length coverage 
less than proportionately.  
 
Finally, the value of the log likelihood for the city model and its high level of statistical 
significance indicate that the null hypothesis of no inefficiency in the cities may be 
rejected. 
 
Before discussing the efficiency of the Indian cities and that of the states in provision of 
roads, the efficiency model for the states is presented in Table 11. 
Table 11: Maximum likelihood estimates of Stochastic Frontier Analysis, India’s states 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard error  z  P>z      
Log of population  -0.1333  0.0738  -1.81  0.071 
Log of population 
density 
-0.3019     0.0950      -3.18     0.001     
Log of per capita 
NSDP 
0.4549     0.3178       1.43     0.152     
Constant  1.0387     3.6593       0.28     0.777     
σv                            0.3492     0.1059                         






v  0.5108     0.2132                         
λ=σu/σv    1.7858     0.2842                         
Note: Dependent variable: road length per 1,000 population. Log likelihood = -22.092504                       
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000. Observations=30. 
Source: Central Statistical Organization, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, and author’s 
computations 
 
Table 11 summarizes the maximum likelihood estimates of state-level efficiency in the 
provision of roads (assuming a half-normal distribution for efficiency). Population 
density has the expected, negative and significant impact on the road length. Rightly, as 
found by other literature, the elasticity of road length with population density is much 
stronger at the urban level (Table 10, -0.37) than at the state-level (elasticity of -0.30, 
Table 11). When one takes into account the fact that overall urban population growth 
occurs through expansion of the urban perimeter by annexation of surrounding 
                                                 
12 The half-normal distribution for (in)efficiency is the default option in STATA when estimating a 
frontier model. Since there is no reason a priori to choose one distribution over the other, I report the 
results from the default distribution, assuming that it is the most commonly used.   22
municipalities with lower densities than the core city, these results are meaningful. The 
log of population has a negative impact on the efficiency of road provision, but is not 
significant at the conventional 1 or 5 per cent levels of significance. State income per 
capita has a positive impact on the provision of roads, but is not statistically significant. 
As in the city model, the significance of the log likelihood in the state model indicates 
that one may reject the null hypothesis of no inefficiency. 
 
Based on these models, what does a comparison of city-level with state-level efficiency 
tell us?13 I predicted city-level and state-level efficiencies (based on the models 
summarized above) with respect to the provision of roads. The findings are interesting. 
The city-level and state-level efficiencies and their distributions are presented in 
Table 12.  
Table 12: Distribution of efficiency, city and state-level, India 
Variable Observations  Mean Std.Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
City-level 
efficiency 
3547        
0.99490 0.00001  0.99488  0.99493 
State-level 
efficiency 
30  0.6531      0.1475     0.1988     0.8804 
Sources: Census of India town directories 2001, Central Statistical Organization, Ministry of Road 
Transport and Highways, and author’s computations. 
 
Table 12 summarizes the primary findings of this study. The cities in India are more 
efficient than the states as far as the provision of roads (in terms of their coverage of 
population) is concerned. On average, the cities have only about 1 per cent of 
inefficiency, whereas the states are only 65 per cent efficient on average. This implies 
that, on average, the states could offer the same coverage of roads with 35 per cent 
fewer resources. 
  
A ranking of the states and cities based on their efficiencies in terms of road provision 
was done. At the city level, the top 191 ranks for city-level efficiency are shared by 
towns in the southern Indian state, Tamil Nadu. These findings are consistent with Paul 
and Sridhar (2009). They found that Tamil Nadu (TN) spent a total of 92,483 during 
1980-85 for creating every additional km of road during 1985-90, whereas another 
Indian state, Uttar Pradesh, spent 3.5 times more than that of TN, 328,788 over 1980-85 
to create an additional km of road during 1985-90.14 They conclude that Tamil Nadu 
was more efficient in the deployment/utilization of resources as it related to provision of 
roads. 
  
What do the city-level efficiency scores and ranks mean for cities which are examined 
in this study from the viewpoint of revenues from land leasing and sales? In terms of 
efficiency with respect to road provision, Jaipur tops the list of the four selected cities 
with a rank of 309 (out of 3,547 cities), Bangalore follows with a rank of 325, Kolkata 
is at 376, trailed by Ahmedabad at 678. Interestingly, the two cities, Jaipur and 
Bangalore, which have been able to capitalize on land leasing and sales, are also the 
                                                 
13 I confirmed from STATA’s technical support that one can look at the efficiency results from the two 
models and make comparisons of the differences (since both use cross-sectional data and similar models). 
However, there is no formal test or methodology to compute a statistic for such a comparison. 
14 One recognizes that the mix of roads (for e.g. rural roads, national and state highways), land terrain, 
and other factors could make a difference to the cost of roads per km.  Nevertheless, these factors may 
account for only a part of the cost differential noted above.   23
ones which are relatively more efficient in the provision of local public services such as 
roads. The cities, Ahmedabad and Jaipur, which are unable to capitalize on the revenues 
from land leasing and sales are also the ones which are relatively inefficient in the 
provision of roads. This lends support to the observation that more efficient cities 
should be provided with greater resources in order to enable them to carry out their 
functions. 
 
When the efficiency scores and ranks of the Indian states were examined, an interesting 
pattern emerged. While the states’ efficiency is way below that of the cities, in the 
provision of roads (as summarized in Table 12), of the 29 states, the top states in terms 
of their efficiency ranks are Orissa (88 per cent efficiency), Kerala and Nagaland (at 85 
per.cent efficiency each), and the most inefficient ones are Jharkhand (only 20 per cent 
efficiency), Jammu and Kashmir, and Haryana (41 per cent efficiency each).15 
  
The relatively greater efficiency of the city governments when compared with that for 
the state governments here is consistent with other evidence which compares, more 
specifically, the performance of UDAs with that of the city governments, from a service 
delivery point of view. A study by Public Affairs Centre (Sekhar and Shah 2006) 
showed that in the third citizen report card (CRC), which was done for Bengaluru in 
2003, the proportion of households reporting complete satisfaction with the city 
government’s (then called the Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (BMP)) services was much 
higher (being 44 per cent)16 than it was for the UDA (the Bangalore Development 
                                                 
15 An attempt was also made to examine the efficiency of cities and states in terms of the provision of 
pucca roads (roads which are covered with concrete and cement) (in the case of cities) and surfaced 
roads (in the case of states) respectively, rather than examining total road length which the models in 
Tables 12 and 13 do. However, even those estimations do not change the findings reported here. In the 
case of the city-level efficiency model, when only pucca road length per 1,000 population is used (rather 
than the total road length including pucca and kuccha roads) as the key efficiency variable to be 
explained, population and population density continue to exert the same negative impact on the pucca 
road length coverage, whereas the city government’s revenue per capita exhibits a positive impact. With 
this model, the six most efficient city governments are again in the southern Indian state, Tamil Nadu (as 
compared with the earlier distribution where the 192 most efficient city governments were located in 
Tamil Nadu). The average city-level efficiency (taking into account the full sample of 4,022 cities) is 
0.99, the same as I find in the earlier (total road length) case. Whereas in the earlier case, the four most 
inefficient city governments were all in Maharashtra, in this case, out of the four most inefficient 
governments, one is in Maharashtra, but the other three are in other states (Gujarat, West Bengal, and 
Andhra Pradesh). 
When a similar exercise was attempted for the state-level efficiency model, however, the maximum 
likelihood iterations would not converge with the assumption of a half-normal distribution for the 
efficiency term. While the exponential distribution converged for the state-level model, this distribution 
for the city-level model did not converge. In any case, the state-level efficiency model (assuming the 
exponential distribution for technical efficiency) showed an average inefficiency of 30 per cent (although 
there were a few states which had no inefficiency—in other words had an efficiency score of 1. These 
were Gujarat, Nagaland, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi). However, since these are based on a different 
assumption regarding distribution of the technical efficiency which did not converge for the city-level 
model, they could not be directly compared. However, when compared with the previous state-level 
model, states become a little more efficient when only surfaced roads are considered, as in this 
specification. 
16 The number of observations on which this is based is 105, the exact question asked being 'Taking 
everything into consideration, are you satisfied /dissatisfied with overall service of the agency?'  The next 
question which was asked was 'If satisfied, to what extent are you satisfied?' the options given being 
'partly satisfied' and 'completely satisfied'.   24
Authority (BDA)), for which the satisfaction level reported by respondents was only 15 
per cent.17 
 
The relatively greater efficiency of the municipal government, when compared with that 
of parastatal entities in India’s context, is also borne out by a study by Sridhar, Reddy 
and Srinath (2011), which was completed for the Expenditure Reforms Commission, 
Government of Karnataka. This study found that parastatal bodies (such as the 
Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board) were unable to satisfy mandatory 
reforms required of them as part of national urban renewal programmes which, as a 
result, had to use their own funds to implement projects, whereas the city governments 
had satisfied most reforms required of them mandatorily, with whatever little physical 
and financial resources they had. 
 
The above findings make sense because local governments are expected to be more 
accountable to the residents since all local infrastructure such as roads are eventually 
locally owned and used, and the local governments have a much better understanding of 
local priorities and preferences rather than the state governments. 
8.1 Policy  implications 
This study has shown that the institutional arrangements for land use are fragmented 
between the UDAs and town planning departments of municipal corporations in India’s 
cities. There are overlaps among various agencies as far as planning and development of 
schemes for town planning are concerned. Given municipal corporations have limited 
control over land assets, especially for commercial purposes (leasing and selling), they 
cannot leverage their land resources for raising revenues. 
  
It is found that urban local governments in India are much more efficient than the state 
governments in the provision of local public services, taking the case of roads. Further, 
city revenues per capita have a positive impact on their provision of roads (in terms of 
their coverage of population). Next, city governments also understand local priorities 
and preferences much better, hence they are more likely to be accountable to their 
residents, as found by Sridhar, Reddy and Srinath (2011), and as argued by the literature 
on decentralization (see Faguet 1997). Given these considerations, it is recommended 
that revenues accruing to UDAs from their land leasing and/or sales be systematically 
transferred to cities in a phased manner. 
 
In the early part of the decade, revenues from land leasing and/or sales were small in the 
case of most cities, but have grown progressively, even in the case of Ahmedabad and 
Kolkata. The results from this study thus show that cities have been attempting to use 
land as a potentially powerful financing tool, and plenty of opportunities remain for 
transfer of funds from land lease and sales from UDAs to municipal authorities.Some 
cities such as Jaipur have already been doing this. The UDA there (the JDA) transfers 
                                                 
17 The number of observations on which this is based is 23, the question being the same as that reported 
above. 
In an earlier report card done for Bengaluru in 1994 by Public Affairs Centre (Paul 1995), the complete 
satisfaction reported for BMP was 5 per cent and that reported for the BDA by respondents was only 1 
per cent (unfortunately the number of observations on which these are based, is unavailable). Based on 
the above, there is some citizen-centric evidence to believe that the satisfaction levels of the citizens have 
always been higher for the city government, when compared with that for the UDA.   25
about 15 per cent of its gross revenues (after transfer of 20 per cent to the state 
government) from land leasing and sales to the Jaipur city government, to enable it to 
carry out municipal functions as specified by the state government. 
  
In Bangalore the UDA (the BDA) transfers funds to the city government in an ad hoc 
way, sometimes as and when required by the city to operate and maintain land 
transferred to it by the BDA. But frequently city governments point out that lands that 
are transferred to them by the UDA are often inadequately developed and serviced, and 
therefore, place a disproportionately large financial burden on them (Mathur and 
Peterson 2006). In 2007, the UDA in Bangalore transferred some 1.5 crores to the city 
government to enable it to do the operations and maintenance of lands transferred to it. 
Such transfers are one-time, sometimes meagre, and are not required by the statute. 
Moreover such transfers by the UDA to the city government are made for the enabling 
of operations and maintenance purposes only, not to enable the carrying out of general 
municipal functions, as is done by Jaipur’s UDA to the city government there.  
 
In Ahmedabad, the city government is required to transfer funds to the UDA, to enable 
it to carry out its functions of city improvement. While the city’s finances were in 
relatively good condition (until octroi abolition), given the city’s increasing burden of 
public services with the merging of surrounding areas, there should be a flow in the 
reverse direction, from the UDA to the city. 
 
In Kolkata, while the city government and the UDA owe something to each other, they 
are in the nature of quid pro quo payments.18 There is no statutory transfer of funds that 
is required by the UDA to the city or vice-versa, as is required in some other cities. 
Hence  it is interesting to note that city governments such as Kolkata would stand to 
benefit substantially if the revenues from land leasing, and/or sales taking place in the 
city area, were to be transferred to the local government by the UDA. Similarly in 
Ahmedabad, given the city government’s service responsibilities, it would make more 
sense for the UDA to transfer some portion of its funds routinely to the city to enable it 
to carry out its functions, rather than the reverse transfer stipulated by the Gujarat Town 
Planning and Urban Development Act. Bangalore and Jaipur are already partly doing 
what this study recommends, and they are also relatively more efficient in the provision 
of roads. Hence transfer of funds and functions from the UDAs to the municipal 
corporations is much recommended for orderly growth of cities, doing away with the 
multiplicity of agencies with respect to land use, and respecting the financial autonomy 
and decentralization spirit of the 74
th CAA. 
  
The above recommendation is also in line with recommendations made by Karnataka’s 
First State Finance Commission (see Mathur and Peterson 2006). This merging has the 
following advantages: 
 
1.  Cities would have enough resources to finance their urban infrastructure 
programmes, which would be in line with the provisions of the 74
th CAA.  
2.  The multiplicity of institutions with respect to land use would be done away 
with. This would enable more orderly growth of cities.  
3.  There would be more efficient provision of public services such as roads. 
                                                 
18 The UDA in Kolkata (called the Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority (KMDA) supplies 
water to the city government (the Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC)), hence the city government 
owes a payment to the UDA. The UDA, in turn, has to pay property tax to the city.    26
 
It is useful to note that since India’s Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission 
(JnNURM) specifies municipalities to prepare a city development plan and other 
statutory plans, a review of the role of UDAs vis-à-vis municipalities will be required to 
be done by all cities. Having said this, land acquisition, land development, sale and 
lease of lands, and preparation of master plans including long-range urban planning and 
determination of land uses are specialized functions, for which the required expertise 
might not be available in most city governments. As Mathur and Peterson (2006) point 
out, the scale and complexity of urban planning could overwhelm the city governments’ 
primary function of service provision and maintenance if such functions were 
transferred to the cities. Hence they suggest that it is unrealistic to simply transfer these 
functions to ULBs by a stroke of the pen. One possible solution which has been 
suggested is to broaden the mandate of the UDA. 
 
However, despite the many advantages the development authorities have with regard to 
land related activity, in practice, the functioning of development authorities and other 
similar agencies has been found to be far from satisfactory (which is consistent with the 
evidence from the citizen report cards summarized earlier). They have not been able to 
control haphazard development on the periphery and on lands that are either notified for 
acquisition or acquired for development. Nor have they been able to effectively put in 
place cost recovery principles for charging for the services that they provide. 
 
Thus it is fundamental to decentralization for cities to participate in the planning 
decisions that affect their future development and future service responsibilities. There 
are several prerequisites for achieving efficient functional performance at the level of 
cities, as Mathur and Peterson (2006) point out. There also has to be a strong 
coordination mechanism between the state, parastatal and other institutions, and the 
cities in matters relating to city development and restructuring and provision of services. 
 
Everything said and done, it should be acknowledged that public land leasing and/or 
sales have the potential to stimulate speculation in the land and real estate markets, and 
cause property prices to rise, as has generally happened in the case of India and China’s 
cities. Further, land may not be a sustainable means of financing, since it is an 
exhaustible resource. A better channel for cities to get access to more finances might be 
the capital market, as that involves credit rating and has the effect of improving their 
governance as well. However, rarely are city projects perceived as being commercially 
viable, for which funds can easily be made available from the bond market. Further, 
rating institutions would bring about difficulties in deciding whether to go by measures 
of the city’s financial performance, such as total revenue including grants, or by 
building appropriate efficiency indicators. This is where this research would prove to be 
of assistance. 
 
Thus, taking the institutional fragmentation with respect to land use and efficiency, and 
accountability of city governments in the provision of public services, there is a need for 
revisiting the institutional roles of the UDAs versus the city governments, and seriously 
considering the transfer of institutional autonomy and requisite resources to municipal 
authorities in matters relating to land, given that it can constitute a substantial addition 
to municipal revenues in India’s cities, and can result in more efficient and accountable 
provision of local services such as roads.   27
9 Concluding  remarks 
While this study has found that land can be quite attractive as a financing tool for cities, 
it has implications for the institutional arrangements pertaining to land between UDAs 
and municipal corporations. It is found that India’s cities are more efficient in the 
provision of public services, taking the case of roads. Hence transfer of finances from 
UDAs to cities in a phased manner is recommended, to enable them to carry out their 
municipal functions which are, until now, in the nature of unfunded mandates imposed 
upon them by the 74
th Constitutional Amendment Act. 
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